

FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO **RADICALIZATION**

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK





ABOUT HEDAYAH

The story of Hedayah begins with the launch of the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF), “an international forum of 29 countries and the European Union with an overarching mission of reducing the vulnerability of people worldwide to terrorism” in September 2011. Members of the GCTF and the wider international community expressed a growing desire for the establishment of a center dedicated to countering violent extremism (CVE) independently and multilaterally. As one of the co-chairs of the CVE Working Group during this ministerial-level launch in New York, the U.A.E. offered to host the first ever International Center of Excellence for CVE. In December 2012, the idea came to life with the inauguration of Hedayah headquarters in Abu Dhabi, U.A.E. Hedayah’s is a neutral, apolitical and non-ideological center welcoming diverse perspectives in addressing the issue of violent extremism in all of its forms and manifestations. Hedayah is a world leader in the field of CVE through its dialogue and communications, capacity building programs, and research and analysis departments. It offers long-term, sustainable solutions through its areas of expertise and collaborative efforts with local partners, practitioners and subject matter experts to implement holistic CVE programs.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Cristina Mattei, Program Manager, Capacity Building Programs, Hedayah.

Cristina is a Program Manager within the Capacity Building Programs Department. She joined Hedayah in 2015. Throughout her time in the organization, she managed the Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters Program, the Preventing Violent Extremism through Education (PVE-E) program and the Youth Radicalization program, amongst other related activities. Cristina leads large programs in the Department in coordination with the team and actively contributes to the strategic growth and expansion of capacity building programs; she has extensive experience in curriculum development, capacity building implementation and stakeholder engagement. She co-authored Hedayah’s MM&E Framework (*Evaluate your CVE Results: Projecting your Impact*, 2019, Hedayah) and authored Hedayah’s CVE-Cycle Framework (*A CVE Cycle: An Individual Trajectory*, 2019, Hedayah).

Sara Zeiger, Former Program Manager, Research and Analysis Department, Hedayah.

Sara previously served as Program Manager for the Research Analysis Department at Hedayah. Sara was in charge of supporting the Director in providing oversight for the Department’s programs, including the Counter-Narrative Library, non-resident Fellowship Program and annual International CVE Research Conference. Sara led the development of an App for Monitoring, Measurement and Evaluation for CVE projects titled MASAR as well as the development of a collection of counter-narratives for three regions (East Africa, South East Asia and the Middle East/North Africa). Sara was also the Co-Director of a NATO SPS Advanced Research Workshop grant on the role of women in CVE, and has extensive experience delivering capacity-building on CVE topics in a variety of countries.

This paper has been reviewed by a number of contributors to include Ivo Veenkamp, Ahmed Al Qasimi, Joseph Gyte, Thomson Hunter, Irene Belmonte, Carlotta Nanni, Lilah El Sayed, Murat Uzunparmak, Talal Faris, Wedad Al Hassen.

CONTENTS

The Process of Radicalization Leading to Violent Extremism	3
Existing Frameworks Explaining Radicalization leading to Violent Extremism (RLVE)	4
Hedayah's Framework: Assessing Potential Radicalization Leading to Violent Extremism	5
Conclusion	11

INTRODUCTION

Academics, practitioners and policymakers have long debated models of radicalization leading to violent extremism (RLVE), and have struggled to find a simple framework to explain how an individual may come to accept and justify the use of violence to achieve their political or ideological goals to the point that they support, advocate for, or carry out terrorist acts. The intention of this paper is not to review all available theories, as the literature on this subject is vast. However, given Hedayah's central role in capacity-building for countering violent extremism (CVE), both for practitioners and policymakers, the purpose of this paper is to present a framework that can easily be explained in the field of CVE, reflects the nuances of the available theories and builds upon the existing evidence base for RLVE.

THE PROCESS OF RADICALIZATION LEADING TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM (RLVE)

The authors of this paper argue that an individual's path towards radicalization is a **non-linear process** and not a systematically predictable event or static moment. Within this process, the individual may progressively and increasingly see violence as a legitimate means to advance their ideological, political or religious agenda¹. In the end, individuals see violence and/or terrorism as a justifiable and feasible options to affirm their ideological, religious or political views. However, the process of RLVE does not always occur in that order—the justifications for violence may come before the ideology, or someone may be coerced into supporting a terrorist act or group and later adopt the ideological elements of that group. In this context, it is important to emphasize that this process is non-linear in that the order is not always consecutive. In addition, it is important to point out that an individual supporting an "extremist" viewpoint does not automatically or necessarily radicalize and progress towards violent extremism.

RLVE can also be seen as a process of socialization as the result of learning to engage in ideologically-motivated violence. Therefore, attitudes towards violent extremism are **fluid** and can change rapidly or slowly.² A number of factors may motivate an individual to shift either to/from violent extremism and it is well-established that there is not a single pathway that pushes individuals towards RLVE.³

Circumstances that can contribute to an individual's engagement in violent extremism can be described as "**factors contributing to radicalization,**" whereas circumstances that motivate the rejection of violent extremism and instead increase, strengthen, restore and/or consolidate resilience are called "**sources of resilience.**" These two concepts can be found at the macro-level (community-level) and micro-level (individual-level) and will be further explained in later sections.

CVE relies on the premise that this process of RLVE requires time, which means that there are potential opportunities for family members, community leaders and practitioners to intervene,

¹ Cristina Mattei, "The CVE-Cycle: An Individual Trajectory", Hedayah, 2019.

² Alex S. Wilner, & Claire-Jehanne Dubouloz. "Transformative Radicalization: Applying Learning Theory to Islamist Radicalization," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 35:5 (2011), 418-438. In particular, radicalization can be understood as a process of socialization – as is the result of learning to engage in violence for the pursuit of ideological objectives. Being a process of learning and socialization, if a person can go through a process of radicalization, the person can reverse the path and become deradicalized.

³ European Union, "Literature Review on Radicalization," Terrorism Prevention via Radicalisation Counter-Narrative Project, (March 28, 2019), <https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/documents/downloadPublic?documentIds=080166e5c2d85f61&appId=PPGMS>.

revert the trend and influence the affected individual. In addition, once “radicalized”, CVE also offers opportunities for an individual to be persuaded away from violent extremism—for example by reducing their extremist viewpoints, or avoiding the justifications for violence. The aforementioned stakeholders may indeed play a crucial role in countering radicalization, as they are usually the ones that regularly interact with the identified vulnerable or radicalized individual. It is for this reason that understanding the factors that contribute to radicalization are critical for CVE and for the related stakeholders that may have the potential to make a difference in preventing a certain individual from supporting or carrying out a terrorist attack.

EXISTING FRAMEWORKS EXPLAINING RADICALIZATION LEADING TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM (RLVE)

RLVE is a process comprising different phases. In an attempt to provide clarity to the phenomenon, many experts have focused on factors contributing to potential radicalization. These are the “negative” influencing factors on a society or individual level that potentially increase susceptibility to anti-social behaviors, including radicalization. From a practitioner perspective, there are two major frameworks in the CVE literature that describe these negative factors: one developed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the other by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). This paper suggests an alternative framework to these, through an approach that overcomes some of the identified challenges of the previous two frameworks.

The first approach is provided by the USAID framework which describes drivers of radicalization as “push” and “pull” factors. For USAID, “**push factors**” can be defined as conditions conducive to violent extremism at the structural level, such as high rate of unemployment, general lack of education or lack of governance.⁴ On the other hand, “**pull factors**” refer to the personal and socio-economic incentives that may contribute to the decision of joining a violent extremist group. This may include a sense of power, religious rewards, or a sense of economic freedom.⁵

The second framework for these “negative” influencing factors contributing to RLVE was developed by RUSI. This framework lists the following factors that contribute to radicalization:

Structural motivators. These include repression, corruption, unemployment, inequality, discrimination, a history of hostility between identity groups, external state interventions in the affairs of other nations, and so on.

Individual incentives. These include a sense of purpose (generated through acting in accordance with perceived ideological tenets), adventure, belonging, acceptance, status, material enticements, fear of repercussions by VE entities, expected rewards in the afterlife, and so on.

Enabling factors. These include the presence of violent extremist mentors (including religious leaders and individuals from social networks, among others), access to radical online

⁴ USAID Policy. *The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency: Putting Principles into Practice*, (New York: USAID, 2011). https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacs400.pdf.

⁵ Ibid.

communities, social networks with violent extremist associations, access to weaponry or other relevant items, a comparative lack of state presence, an absence of familial support, and so on.⁶

RUSI also traced a link between specific drivers and support for violent extremist ideologies and violent extremist actions. Notably, the drivers of support for violent extremism may be different from the drivers of direct involvement into violent extremist activities. In particular, economic or practical incentives and opportunities play an important role in explaining individual's direct involvement into violent extremist activities, while socio-economic inequalities and real or perceived injustice may better explain individual support for violent extremism.⁷

USAID's framework has the benefit of separating the factors of a person's or group's environment from the factors that may motivate an individual or group emotionally or personally. This language is particularly useful in the case of policies that address the macro-level (e.g. whole of society) such as communication campaigns targeting the wider society or structural socio-economic interventions. However, it does not offer any explanation on the environmental circumstances, such as the psychological, historical, contextual circumstances, that pertain to the individual level, or specific groups of identified individuals. It also does not offer specific guidance on where to position the existence of specific violent extremist ideologies and macro-level narratives in a given region, and the type of impact this might have on groups or individuals. RUSI's framework does attempt to address some of these gaps by separating out "enabling factors," which explains individualized level of radicalization to some extents. However, the nuances of "enabling factors" are not sufficiently explained, because different individuals may have different reactions to the same negative factors present, and the outcome may be different.

As such, the biggest problem with these previous conceptualizations is that they have been outlined to only focus on the risks and negative factors. While it is important to outline the risks, it is equally important to identify elements that might mitigate potential radicalization—the "sources of resilience." In both frameworks, there is no mention of "sources of resilience" at the community level, nor individual protective factors as elements potentially counter-balancing the negative factors. These are critical factors for explaining why one person with similar negative factors may end up carrying out a terrorist attack, and a different person may be an outspoken voice for change in their community.

In 2020, USAID released an updated policy⁸, which recognized the importance of resilience in CVE programming. In this context, Hedayah's framework argues that "sources of resilience" should be distinguished between the macro-level and individual-level in a systematic manner, as they relate to different types of tools, practices and assessments.

⁶ James Khalil and Martine Zeuthen, "Countering Violent Extremism and Risk Reduction: A Guide to Programme Design and Evaluation," *RUSI Whitehall Report 2-16* (London: RUSI, 2016), p. 9. https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/20160608_cve_and_rr.combined.online4.pdf.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ *USAID Policy*. Policy for Countering Violent Extremism through Development Assistance, (Washington D.C: USAID, 2020). <https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USAID-publication-Policy-for-Countering-Violent-Extremism-through-Development-Assistance-April2020.pdf>

HEDAYAH'S FRAMEWORK: ASSESSING POTENTIAL RADICALIZATION LEADING TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM (RLVE)

Hedayah draws upon RUSI's and USAID's models and tries to overcome some of the challenges by elaborating on the "negative" factors at both the macro-level and the individual-level. In short, this means the addition of a category of "macro-level pull factors" that explains community-based narratives that could contribute to the appeal of violent extremism. This also means the elaboration of certain individual elements that pertain to psychology, history and personal experiences of an individual. Most importantly, it also considers the "positive factors" in a community and at the individual level that can counteract the potential negative factors contributing to RLVE.

It should be noted that all of these factors should be evaluated in the local context and cannot be generalized to all circumstances. It is also important to stress that there is no automatic link between these factors and RLVE. For example, while "high rate of unemployment" may be identified as a potential factor, as it may contribute to "personal frustration" ultimately leading the individual embracement of radicalization, this is not sufficient to claim there is a "risk" for radicalization. Such a claim will need to be based on a more robust analysis of the individual context. For this reason, as "causality" is not empirically evident, the use of the language "root causes" to describe factors contributing to potential radicalization may be problematic.

It is also important to note that, even when both macro and individual- level push and pull factors are present, progressing radicalization could still be the absent. Sometimes the RLVE process can be catalyzed by a "trigger factor" or a significant event or circumstance that can cause a strong impact and shift an individual from grievance/mobilization to partaking in or actively supporting violent acts.

There is also a specific role of the recruiter—an agent (either online or in person) that persuades an individual towards radicalization. The recruiter exploits the vulnerabilities and needs of that individual in the recruitment narratives they use. In this context, it appears evident that the CVE practitioner should do the same—assess the positive and negative factors, and design an intervention to mitigate the negative factors and/or build and strengthen the positive ones.

Based on this premise, Hedayah's conceptualization of factors contributing to potential radicalization is summarized in **Figure 1**, followed by a description of that chart.




Figure 1. Assessing Potential Radicalization. RLVE is influenced by macro-level and individual-level factors. The graph intends to unpack all the potential factors contributing to radicalization, to include both the “negative” factors and the “positive” ones.

The chart “Assessing Potential Radicalization” can essentially be divided into two components: the top part referring to the “macro level” factors and the bottom part referring to the “individual factors.” The benefit of this conceptualization is that it helps to distinguish between community-

level factors and individual-level factors. It also allows for the terminology at the community level to be consistent with the development sector (e.g. USAID's framework), and the terminology at the individual-level to be consistent with what is being used in psychology and sociology where practitioners are working one-on-one with individuals vulnerable to radicalization, or already radicalized.

MACRO (COMMUNITY-LEVEL) FACTORS

At the community level, there are three components that are relevant to describe in more detail: macro-level push factors, macro-level pull factors, and community resilience mechanisms.

Macro-Level Push Factors are in alignment with USAID's framework and similar to RUSI's concept of "structural motivators." These describe the structural conditions that might make an environment more conducive to RLVE. It is important to note that such factors do not automatically lead to radicalization. Instead, they simply create environmental conditions for social, political or cultural vulnerability at the macro level. Some examples of push factors may include:

- Social marginalization of a specific group;
- General inequality of opportunities (e.g. for education, access to justice);
- General lack of employment opportunities;
- Real or perceived injustice by a particular ethnic or religious group;
- Widespread corruption.

If and when push factors contribute to an individual's personal grievances or perceived injustices, these individuals may face a situation of vulnerability. In other words, macro-level push factors may increase the chances of individual or personal grievances, potentially making them vulnerable for possible recruitment. However, it should be noted that the extent to which such push factors might influence the individual situation also depends on the existence of individual personal circumstances (e.g. individual background, history, motivations, social networks) and this is because push factors are not causally linked to RLVE. In other words, being "unemployed" is not sufficient to indicate that somebody is automatically going to be radicalized. The actual outcome also depends on the social context, individual situation and the existence of specific groups that are present on the ground. In this sense, macro-level push factors are not sufficient to explain the reasons why an individual may enter the RLVE process. These factors affect a large number of people, sometimes whole communities or countries, but only a small number may become involved in violent extremism, which indicates that RLVE depends on individual reception and also may require the existence of other simultaneous conditions.

Macro-Level Pull Factors are represented by the existence of palatable violent extremist narratives or ideals that resonate or appeal to segments of the population or specific communities. Pull factors represent the "ideological" element that may influence community attitudes. In other words, violent extremist groups tend to "take ownership" of specific community values and build their narratives on these. A practical example is the ideal of the "caliphate" for Muslim communities that was coopted by the Daesh narrative, or the ideal of "economic and social equality" underlined by some communist-affiliated terrorist groups (e.g. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC). These ideals are not necessarily negative in

and of themselves—in fact the macro-level “pull” factors usually appeal to some sense of common humanity or community. However, the presence of the appeal of those narratives within a particular context, combined with violent extremist narratives misusing that appeal, is what makes the macro-level pull factors a “negative” factor that might lead to potential RLVE. It should be noted here that this is a clear example of why “positive” factors may also need to be considered. As a matter of fact, the appeal of an ideal Muslim “caliphate” in a particular society could actually be a community-level resilient factor leading the community more broadly to rejecting the claims of Daesh, because that particular community sees Daesh’s claims to the “caliphate” as false.

Finally, although such elements may resonate well with particular communities, the specific meaning that the single individual sees in them depends again on personal circumstances. This means that it is not sufficient to be part of the “groups” for which the ideal resonates to be identified as vulnerable to RLVE.

Contrasting the potential negative factors of radicalization at the community level is the concept of “Community Resilience.” As previously illustrated, it is not possible to assess RLVE without a proper overview of the positive strengths of a community or individual. Generally, resilience refers to “the quality of being able to return quickly to a previous good condition after problems.”⁹ However, resilience in the context of CVE can also mean building knowledge, skills and abilities to protect against factors that might lead to radicalization.

As such, drawing on previously-established disaster-prevention methods and the development sector, **Community Resilience Mechanisms** can be referred to as “means of enhancing community assets.”¹⁰ This includes ways to “harness and enhance existing social connections while endeavoring to not damage or diminish them.”¹¹ Building community resilience also depends on community-based mechanisms that try to address community problems and social grievances. For example, it includes participatory community partnerships, and participatory approaches in managing public affairs. Community resilience is heavily dependent on the existence of a substratum of positive values such as solidarity and justice. It can include formal or informal mechanisms to address problems such as conflicts or unemployment. Examples of community resilience mechanisms may include:

- The existence of public forums where citizens and community members can express their grievances and look for solutions, such as Majlis in many societies in the Middle East;
- The existence of cultural mechanisms for expressing tension through insults, mockery, and sarcasm in a “joking” way, such as the tradition, *la parentée à plaisanterie*,¹² which is prevalent in many parts of Western Africa.

⁹ “Resilience”, Cambridge Dictionary, accessed on 7 September 2021, <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/resilience>

¹⁰ Heidi B. Ellis and Saida Abdi, “Building Community Resilience to Violent Extremism Through Genuine Partnerships”, *American Psychologist* (72)3, 289- 300 (2017) <https://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/releases/amp-amp0000065.pdf>

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² A tradition that allows members of certain groups to mock each other without harming their relationship. See Mark Davidheiser, “Joking for Peace. Social Organization, Tradition, and Change in Gambian Conflict Management”, *Cahiers d’études africaines* (184), 2006, <http://journals.openedition.org/etudesafriaines/15409>

INDIVIDUAL FACTORS

The macro-level push and pull factors described above are only a part of the holistic analysis of the factors that potentially contribute to RLVE. While macro-level factors are community-level elements that assist in explaining and understanding potential RLVE within a certain local area, or within a group with common characteristics, there is no direct causal link between such factors and the individual radicalization process.¹³ In fact, going back to the previous example concerning “high rates of unemployment”, it was mentioned that “being unemployed” is not sufficient to claim there is a risk of radicalization. However, a particular individual may be more frustrated than others for the widespread situation of unemployment within his/her country, and, differently from others, may develop a *personal grievance* potentially exploitable by violent extremist recruiters on the ground. The different perception of push and pull factors at the individual-level, depends on the specific personal conditions, social context and personal history that will be elaborated in this section.

The USAID’s framework attempts to address the “negative” individual factors, by including them in the category of “pull” factors; in this sense, the USAID’s framework does not distinguish between the personal factors and the broader, community concepts that may make violent extremism appealing. Similarly, RUSI describes the “individual incentives” as factors contributing to RLVE, but does not take into account the environmental or personal circumstances that may “push” a particular individual towards vulnerability and ultimately to potential radicalization.

Moreover, practitioners - such as psychologists and social workers- tend to utilize a specific approach affiliated with assessing an individual potentially vulnerable to radicalization or other anti-social behaviors. This approach usually looks at the “negative” qualities defining them as *Needs and/or Risks Factors* of the individual, whereas the “positive” qualities are referred to as *Protective Factors/ Personal Strengths*. These factors can be captured through an Individual-focused *Needs Assessment* process.

The circumstances that may play a role in making someone vulnerable to social problems and in particular, RLVE, at the individual level are referred to as **Individual Needs and Risks**. These “negative” factors at the individual level can be divided into two components: “individual vulnerabilities” and “individual incentives.” An individual need can be related to a gap that could lead to potential vulnerability: e.g. lack of employment opportunity; or, to an incentive: e.g. the violent extremist group offers a strong and attractive identity.

In terms of “individual vulnerabilities,” this refers to the personal and/or environmental conditions that may lead an individual to be more susceptible to anti-social behaviors, including RLVE. These conditions may or may not be related to “macro pull factors” as explained in the previous section. Some examples of vulnerabilities (personal and/or environmental conditions) related to the individual situation may include:

- Domestic violence situation at home;
- Easy access to weapons through social networks;
- Lack of individual skills and abilities to perform either socially or economically;
- Family members or peers involved in violent extremism who exercise a powerful influence;

¹³ Sarma, Kiran. “Risk assessment and the prevention of radicalization from nonviolence into terrorism” *American Psychologist*. (3), 278-288. [National University of Ireland, Galway: 2017].

- Individual lack of stable positive identity and sense of belonging.

It is important to highlight that the above-mentioned individual needs are not necessarily specific to radicalization, and alone are not sufficient to label an individual as particularly vulnerable to RLVE. The presence of these conditions simply highlights a potential vulnerability to a variety of different deviant behaviors, including RLVE if there is sufficient information to justify such assumption.

In order to shift from a “vulnerability” to “radicalizing” one or more “individual incentive(s)” may be present. The “individual incentives” refer to the individual’s attraction or appeal to violent extremism. Some of these individual incentives include:

- Perceived increased social status in the violent extremist group;
- Economic and practical incentives provided by the violent extremist group;
- Appeal of the group identity available from the violent extremist group;
- Sense of adventure acquired or acquirable by joining a violent extremist group;
- Desire for revenge fulfilled by joining a violent extremist group;
- Sense of community and ‘brotherhood’ acquired or acquirable in the violent extremist group.

As is the case also at the macro-level, an appropriate assessment should not only capture these factors but also the **Individual Protective Factors and Strengths**. These can be defined as individual factors related to personal circumstances that help the individual to positively react to stressful situations, grievances and traumatic circumstances. In the context of CVE, protective factors and strengths are those elements that enable an individual to reject and be resilient against violent extremist acts and ideologies. While examples of risk factors might be *exposure to violent extremist ideologies in the family context* or *lack of religious education*, relevant protective factors might be *a close relationship with a positive role model* or *effective emotional coping strategy*.

Individual Protective Factors and Strengths therefore pertains to individual resilience, and refer to the individual’s specific circumstances that can be mobilized and built through cognitive and behavioral processes. It involves enhancing an individual’s ability to respond to negative impacts or resist radicalizing narratives. CVE programs that develop individual resilience often draw upon other fields such as health care, psychology and education.¹⁴

CONCLUSION

Based on this explanation, **Figure 1: “Assessing Potential Radicalization”** offers a comprehensive picture of the existing elements that may play a role in enabling RLVE. In particular, this model unpacks these elements distinguishing them between macro-level factors and individual-level factors. The approach draws upon existing frameworks such as the one from RUSI and USAID, but it is more explicit in differentiating the macro-level and the individual-level. It also offers a comprehensive vision of the factors that may resist the rise of RLVE, such as community resilience and individual resilience, represented by protective factors and strengths.

¹⁴ For example, Educational approach using Moral Disengagement Theory to build cognitive resilience. See Anne Aly, Elisabeth Taylor & Saul Karnovsky, “Moral Disengagement and Building Resilience to Violent Extremism: An Education Intervention”, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, (37)4, 369-385, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2014.879379>